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WILLIS MORTON, as an individual and in his official 
capacity as Administrator, New Jersey State Prison; 
SHIRLEY TYLER, as an individual and in her 
official capacity as Assistant Superintendent, 
New Jersey State Prison; 
J. MCGOVERN, as an individual and in his official 
capacity as Disciplinary Hearing Officer 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 97-03159) 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 11, 1998 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 30, 1998) 
 
       Hassan Jenkins 
 




       Peter Verniero 
       Attorney General of New Jersey 
       Mary C. Jacobson 
       Assistant Attorney General 
       Ronald L. Bollheimer 
       Deputy Attorney General 
       Office of Attorney General of 
       New Jersey 
       Department of Law & Public Safety 
       Division of Criminal Justice 
       Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
       Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Hassan Jenkins, an inmate at the New Jersey 
State Prison, proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1915, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 on 
August 13, 1997, against appellees Willis E. Morton, 
individually and as administrator of the prison, Shirley 
Tyler, individually and as assistant superintendent of the 
prison, and James McGovern, individually and as a 
disciplinary hearing officer. The complaint asserted that the 
appellees had violated Jenkins' due process and equal 
protection rights in disciplinary proceedings in which 
sanctions were imposed. The original sanction period 
imposed in those proceedings was reduced on Jenkins' 
administrative appeal. It is undisputed that the 
administrative appeal exhausted Jenkins' conventional 
administrative remedies, and it is also undisputed that 
Jenkins did not appeal from the imposition of the reduced 
sanctions to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate 
Division, as authorized as of right by N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(a)(2). 
 
The summons and complaint were served on Morton and 
Tyler but McGovern was not served. Morton and Tyler 
moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1996, which, insofar as germane 
here, provides: 
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       No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
       conditions under [42 U.S.C. S 1983], or any other 
       Federal Law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, 
       or other correctional facility until such administrative 
       remedies as are available are exhausted. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a). The district court, in ruling on the 
motion to dismiss, explained that the New Jersey 
Administrative Code provides a grievance procedure for 
challenging disciplinary decisions and that once the 
"inmate has exhausted the remedies provided by the 
Administrative Code, he has an automatic right to appeal 
the decision to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate 
Division" under N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(a)(2).1 
 
The court then indicated: 
 
       that the sanction imposed upon the plaintiff by the 
       Department of Corrections was a final agency decision 
       and as such, upon exhausting the remedies available 
       to him through the Administrative Code, plaintiff's 
       next remedy was to challenge the decision with the 
       Appellate Division. This Court further notes, that 
       plaintiff failed in this case to challenge the decision in 
       the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. 
       As such, plaintiff has failed to exhaust all 
       administrative remedies available to him. 
 
Accordingly, the court concluded that inasmuch as Jenkins 
had "failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available 
to him, [his] complaint must be dismissed in accordance 
with the [Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996]." Thus, the 
court entered an order on November 21, 1997, dismissing 
the complaint as to all defendants and closing the case. 
Jenkins then appealed. We exercise plenary review on this 
appeal. 
 
This appeal raises a narrow but important point: did 
Congress intend to include appeals to the state judicial 
system within the administrative remedies which a prisoner 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Administrative Code provisions for appeal of disciplinary decisions 
are set forth in N.J. Admin. Code tit. 10A, S 4-11.1 et seq. (1996). We 
need not describe them in detail as appellees do not contend that 
Jenkins did not exhaust them. 
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must exhaust before bringing an action described in section 
1997e(a)?2 We recognize that it might be sensible for 
Congress to provide that a prisoner first exhaust both his 
state administrative and judicial remedies before bringing 
an action described within section 1997e(a). But the 
problem with our observation, and thus with the district 
court's opinion, is that there is a well-established 
distinction between administrative and judicial remedies 
and Congress, in terms, did not mandate that the prisoner 
must exhaust his administrative remedies and exhaust his 
right to judicial appellate review before bringing an action 
within section 1997e(a). McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 
140, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (1992), highlights the distinction 
between administrative and judicial remedies because the 
Court, in discussing exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
explained: 
 
       [E]xhaustion promotes judicial efficiency in at least two 
       ways. When an agency has the opportunity to correct 
       its own errors, a judicial controversy may well be 
       mooted, or at least piecemeal appeals may be avoided. 
       And, even where a controversy survives administrative 
       review, exhaustion of the administrative procedure may 
       produce a useful record for subsequent judicial 
       consideration, especially in a complex or technical 
       factual context. 
 
Id. at 146, 112 S.Ct. at 1086-87 (citations omitted). 
 
We also observe that the Supreme Court has stated that 
"policy considerations alone cannot justify judicially 
imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is consistent with 
congressional intent." Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 
496, 513, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2566 (1982). Moreover, Patsy 
makes clear that exhaustion of administrative remedies 
ordinarily is not required before a plaintiff may bring a 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 action. Thus, the exhaustion requirements in 
section 1997e(a) run counter to the general rule under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983. In the circumstances, we naturally are 
reluctant to apply section 1997e(a) to mean other than 
what it says: the prisoner must exhaust his "administrative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that the appellees do not contend that this action is not a 
type of case governed by section 1997e(a). 
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remedies" as that term is conventionally understood, but 
need not exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing an 
action governed by that section. 
 
The little direct judicial precedent germane under section 
1997e(a) supports our result. Thus, in Alexandroai v. 
California Dep't of Corrections, 985 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. Cal. 
1997), the court described exhaustion under section 
1997e(a) as follows: 
 
       Before refiling, Plaintiff must exhaust all available 
       administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
       S 1997e(a). Thus, in addition to filing his inmate appeal 
       forms, Plaintiff must submit a formal appeal for second 
       level review. If unsuccessful at that level, Plaintiff must 
       then submit a formal appeal for third level review to 
       the director of the California Department of Corrections 
       or the director's designee. Only after Plaintiff has gone 
       through each of these steps may he be said to have 
       exhausted his available administrative remedies. 
 
Id. at 970. Similarly in Hobson v. DeTella, 1997 WL 619822 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1997), the court described exhaustion 
under section 1997e(a) as follows: 
 
        The formal grievance procedure allows an inmate to 
       file a written grievance addressed to the Grievance 
       Officer. 20 Ill. Adm. Code. Sec. 504.810. Upon 
       reviewing the written grievance, the Grievance Officer 
       makes a recommendation to the warden of the facility 
       or his designee. The inmate then receives a decision. 
       20 Ill. Adm. Code Sec. 504.830. 
 
        If the inmate feels that the Grievance Officer did not 
       resolve the matter to his satisfaction, the inmate can 
       appeal to the Director of the Department of Corrections 
       (`Director'). The Director determines if the grievance 
       requires a hearing before the Administrative Review 
       Board (`Board'). If a hearing is required, the Board 
       schedules one and submits its findings to the Director. 
       The Director reviews the findings and makes afinal 
       determination about the grievance. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 
       Sec. 504.850. Once the Board issues a final decision, 
       the inmate has exhausted all available administrative 
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       remedies. See Rhoden v. Detella, No. 95 C. 6585, 1996 
       WL 5566975 *4 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1996). 
 
Id. at *2. It will be noted that neither court mentioned that 
judicial review was an administrative remedy. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the order of the 
district court entered November 21, 1997, and will remand 
the case to that court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. Obviously we do not imply that we have 
a view on whether this action is meritorious. The parties 
will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
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